Extrapolation in games of coordination and dominance solvable games by Mengel, F. & Sciubba, E.
  
 
Extrapolation in games of coordination and
dominance solvable games
Citation for published version (APA):
Mengel, F., & Sciubba, E. (2010). Extrapolation in games of coordination and dominance solvable games.
(METEOR Research Memorandum; No. 034). Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of
Business and Economics.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2010
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
Friederike Mengel, Emanuela Sciubba 
 
Extrapolation in Games of 
Coordination and Dominance 
Solvable Games 
 
RM/10/034 
 
 
 
Extrapolation in Games of Coordination and Dominance Solvable Games∗
Friederike Mengel†
Maastricht University
Emanuela Sciubba‡
Birkbeck College London
July 12, 2010
Abstract
We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment
ﬁrst play either the dominance solvable guessing game or a Coordination version of the guessing game for
ﬁve rounds. Afterwards they play a 3x3 normal form game for ten rounds with random matching which is
either a game solvable through iterated elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS), a pure Coordination
game or a Coordination game with pareto ranked equilibria. We ﬁnd strong evidence that participants
do extrapolate between games. Playing a strategically diﬀerent game hurts compared to the control
treatment where no guessing game is played before and in fact impedes convergence to Nash equilibrium
in both the 3x3 IEDS and the Coordination games. Playing a strategically similar game before leads to
faster convergence to Nash equilibrium in the second game. In the Coordination games some participants
try to use the ﬁrst game as a Coordination device. Our design and results allow us to conclude that
participants do not only learn about the population and/or succesful actions, but that they are also able
to learn structural properties of the games.
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1 Introduction
How people learn in any given game has received a lot of attention both by economic theorists and in
experimental economics. In many cases of interest, though, decision-makers are faced with many diﬀerent
strategic situations, and the number of possibilities is so vast that a particular situation is practically
never experienced twice. A tacit assumption of standard learning models is that players extrapolate their
experience from previous interactions similar to the current one. How people transfer knowledge between
seemingly quite diﬀerent situations, though, has received much less attention in the literature.1
From an applied perspective understanding extrapolation and learning transfers across games is impor-
tant for at least two reasons. First it can help us make predictions in situations where such eﬀects can be
expected. An example could be the introduction of a new law or institution where behavior under the new
institution is likely to be aﬀected by previous regulations. Understanding how people extrapolate between
games can also enable the designer of a mechanism to structure interactions in such a way that “desired”
extrapolation takes place. Think for example about the problem of organization design. Some given set of
tasks need to be accomplished in the organization, but the designer can choose who interacts with who and
in which types of strategic situations. Understanding extrapolation can help her design workﬂows in a more
eﬃcient way.
On a more fundamental level one could even argue that, unless we understand which knowledge economic
agents extrapolate from one game to other games, we cannot understand what they have learned in the ﬁrst
place.2 In particular we may distinguish three diﬀerent types of learning and extrapolation.
There is a large class of learning models, where learning is purely outcome based. In those models
people learn simply about succesful actions and choose more succesful actions more often in the future.
Reinforcement learning rules are an example of this ﬁrst category.3 If this is all people learn in games, then
in terms of extrapolation there can be at best “naive extrapolation” , i.e. participants may tend to choose
succesful actions in one game with higher probability in diﬀerent subsequent games.
In a second class of models people learn about the population. In these models players learn about the
behaviour of other players in the population and then best respond to beliefs which they have formed through
learning. Learning models such as ﬁctitious play or myopic best responses fall in this category.4 In terms of
population learning models extrapolation could imply that participants transfer some knowledge about the
population to other games. If this is the case than playing any game (irrespective of the strategic content)
should improve convergence to equilibrium in games played subsequently within the same population.
All of these rules have in common, though, that players do not learn anything structural about the
underlying game. For example all the rules mentioned before imply that if we play the same game again
but e.g. relabel actions participants will have to start learning all over again. Hence some authors have
enhanced standard models with the possibility of action-relabeling. (See e.g. Stahl and Haruvy, 2009).
However learning may also be structural, i.e. people may learn something about the underlying structure
of strategic interactions. This may go well beyond the case where games are the same up to action-relabeling.
1For some theoretical work illustrating such eﬀects see Jehiel (2005),Mengel (2007) or Steiner and Stewart (2008). Experi-
mental literature will be discussed below in detail.
2Manski (2002) makes a somewhat related point showing that learning or decision rules cannot be identiﬁed from observing
choice data in a single game.
3See e.g. Bush and Mosteller (1951), Roth and Erev (1995) or Mengel (2009).
4See e.g. the textbook by Fudenberg and Levine (1998). There are also hybrid models with elements of both outcome based
learning and population learning. One example is experience weighted attraction learning (Camerer and Ho, 2004).
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For example people may learn how to identify dominated strategies, or they may learn about how to avoid
coordination cycles etc. In such a case, experience in games which are similar in the type of strategic
interaction that is entailed (e.g. games which appear very diﬀerent, but are all dominance solvable), will aid
convergence towards equilibrium play in subsequent games of the same type. Such structural learning does
obviously not exclude the possibility that people learn about the population or engage in outcome based
learning in addition.
In this paper we attempt a systematic study of extrapolation between games. To this aim we design a
simple experiment where participants interact in two diﬀerent games and study (i) whether and (ii) which
type of extrapolation (and hence learning) takes place between the two games.
Empirically extrapolation is most interesting if it occurs between two diﬀerent games. In all our treat-
ments the two games studied diﬀer in the action set, the set of players, the number of players, the framing
of the game (payoﬀ matrix versus guessing game), the payoﬀs and the repeated nature of the game. The
only dimension in which our games are similar is their ‘strategic nature’.5 In particular we consider two
types of games. Firstly we study games which are solvable through deliberative reasoning (more precisely
through iterated elimination of dominated strategies, henceforth IEDS). Secondly we study games which
require some coordination among players, i.e. games where deductive equilibrium analysis based on common
knowledge of rationality fails to determine a unique strategy proﬁle.
To analyse extrapolation we run treatments where subjects are able to learn through strategically similar
games (i.e. a dominance solvable game followed by another dominance solvable game, or a coordination
game followed by another coordination game) and treatments where sujects are faced with a sequence
of strategically dissimilar games (i.e. a dominance solvable game followed by a coordination game or a
coordination game followed by a dominance solvable game).
In all our treatments the ﬁrst game being played is a variant of the so called ‘guessing game’ (or
‘beauty contest game’), which is played 5 times repeatedly in ﬁxed groups of four (Nagel, 1995). In the
ﬁrst (standard) variant all participants have to simultaneously guess a number between 0 and 100. The
participant closest to 70% of the average guess wins ﬁve Euros. This game is solvable through IEDS and
the unique Nash equilibrium is that everyone guesses zero. In the second variant the participant closest to
the average guess wins. This second variant is hence a coordination game, where every outcome in which
all participants choose the same number is a Nash equilibrium. The second variant actually corresponds to
Keynes’s original ’Gedankenexperiment’. (Keynes, 1936).
As a second game participants play one of three possible 3x3 normal form games for ten rounds, being
randomly rematched in each round. One of the two 3x3 games is a game solvable through IEDS with a
unique Nash equilibrium and the other games are a pure coordination game and a coordination game with
pareto ranked equilibria.
Our focus is on subjects’ behavior in the second game. For each game - the IEDS and the coordination
game - we have three treatments (hence a total of nine treatments). One where only the 3x3 game is played,
one where the 3x3 game is preceded by the 70% version of the guessing game and one where it is preceded
by the ‘Keynes version’ (100%). Hence for each of the two 3x3 games we have a treatment where subjects
gain prior experience in a strategically similar game, a treatment where subjects gain prior experience in a
strategically dissimilar game, and a baseline treatment where the 3x3 game is played on its own.
5Some other papers have studied learning transfer among similar games. Gneezy et al (2010) for example show that
participants are able to ‘learn’ backward induction by playing similar games. See also Rapoport et al (2000). We discuss related
literature in more detail below.
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Our experimental ﬁndings as far as the guessing games are concerned are in line with the established
experimental literature on these games. In the standard version of the guessing game (70% version), we ﬁnd
that guesses converge towards zero (with an average of about 9 in the last round). In the 100% version of
the guessing game, they converge to about 40-50.
As far as extrapolation is concerned, we ﬁnd solid evidence that learning across games does take place:
for both the 3x3 coordination game and the 3x3 IEDS game behavior is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across the
three treatments. Hence subjects do behave diﬀerently when they have obtained previous experience in
strategically similar or dissimilar games compared to when they play the 3x3 game on its own.
More in detail we ﬁnd that having played a strategically similar game before leads to better (faster)
learning in the second game. On the other hand playing a strategically diﬀerent game hurts play, not only
when compared to the situation where a similar game is played but also compared to the baseline, where no
other game is played before. In particular it impedes convergence to Nash equilibrium in both dominance
solvable and coordination games. One possible interpretation for this ﬁnding is that playing a coordination
game where some intuition (or ‘gut-feeling’) is needed in order to anticipate what others will play and reach
a Nash equilibrium, may bring participants into the wrong ‘mode’ of play when they afterwards face a game
which is solvable through IEDS, and vice versa. Kuo et al. (2009) in fact ﬁnd evidence that two diﬀerent
brain regions are involved when people play these diﬀerent classes of games.
Our observed treatment diﬀerences cannot be explained by models of outcome-based or population
learning alone. The fact that playing a strategically similar game speeds up convergence while playing a
strategically diﬀerent game hurts compared to the baseline provides evidence for structural learning. Subjects
do seem to recognise structural properties of the game and succeed in transfering acquired knowledge across
two games which are strategically similar.
We also ﬁnd some evidence for ‘naive extrapolation’ (or learning about successful strategies, irrespective
of the strategic context). In particular, we ﬁnd that in the ﬁrst round of the 3x3 game subjects are relatively
more likely to play an action which has a similar label to the modal outcome of the guessing game that
they have played before. This eﬀect is weak, but statistically signiﬁcant, in the 3x3 IEDS game. It is
much stronger in the 3x3 coordination games, where clearly some participants attempt to establish the
modal outcome of the guessing game as a coordination device. There is some literature trying to show
how exogenous (and payoﬀ irrelevant) statements may create “sunspot equlibria” and lead participants to
play diﬀerent equilibria in a coordination game.6 In our experiment we show that previous experience in a
diﬀerent game can potentially play a similar role, since some participants try to use the modal behavior in
the ﬁrst game as a Coordination device.
Our experiment can also shed some light into the question of how we should think about similarity in
games as opposed to decision problems. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) and Rubinstein (1988) both use
distance in payoﬀ space or probabilities as a similarity criterion for decision problems. In games it is much
less clear when we should call two games “similar”.7 The reason is that while two payoﬀ matrices may
be very close in terms of distance in payoﬀ space the games may still be very diﬀerent strategically. Our
experimental results suggest that such strategic similarity matters indeed for extrapolation in spite of the
fact that games appear very diﬀerent.
6See e.g. Fehr, Heinemann and Llorente-Saguer (2010).
7Steiner and Stewart (2009) use closeness in payoﬀ space. Mengel (2009) shows that strategic similarity matters in an
evolutionary model with endogenous equivalence classes of games.
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In addition our results allow us to gain some insight into interpretations of the guessing game.8 There
has been some debate as to how to interpret the results in this game and whether people do learn about
IEDS. Our results show that there is indeed some structural learning in this game. In particular it seems that
participants do learn something about the process of IEDS in the guessing game, since they are subsequently
able to extrapolate such knowledge to a diﬀerent game, also solvable through IEDS. In line with Grosskopf
and Nagel’s (2009) explanation it seems to be mostly the quality (and speed) of learning which is positively
aﬀected by extrapolation in our experiment.
There are a few other papers in the experimental literature dealing with learning transfers, extrapolaton
or categorization. Stahl and Haruvy (2009) study learning transfer between ‘dissimilar’ symmetric normal
form games.9 They ﬁnd that a model of experience-weighted attraction learning augmented with action
relabeling performs well in explaining the initial choices in each game. Grimm and Mengel (2009) study
learning in a multiple games environment, where participants face diﬀerent normal form games randomly
drawn in each period. They ﬁnd evidence for outcome based learning and extrapolation along action labels.
Huck, Jehiel and Rutter (2007) also ﬁnd evidence for categorical thinking based on population learning in
an experiment. Grosskopf et al.(2010) ﬁnd support for case based decision making as proposed by Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1995).
Other than the papers mentioned above we are not aware of studies that systematically study extrapola-
tion between diﬀerent games. Several studies have found more or less explicit evidence that there is learning
transfer between games. Examples are Weber (2003) in a study of ‘feedback-less’ learning, Rapoport et al.
(2000), Cooper and Kagel (2003, 2008) or Chong et al. (2006) among others. Other studies have analysed
learning across games which are very similar except for one or two parameters or payoﬀs. Camerer et al
(1998) look at learning transfer between IEDS guessing games with diﬀerent parameters. Selten et al. (2003)
let subjects submit strategies for tournaments with many diﬀerent 3 × 3 games and ﬁnd that the induced
fraction of pure strategy Nash equilibria increases over time.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the experimental design. In Section 3 we
present our hypotheses and in Section 4 we present the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Design
The experiment was conducted in February and June 2010 at the BEE-Lab at Maastricht University. 206
students participated in one of the following treatments:
T1 (IEDS): In IEDS participants were randomly rematched for ten rounds to play the game shown in
Table 1.
T2 (COR): In COR participants were randomly rematched for ten rounds to play the game shown in
Table 2.
T2* (COR*): In COR* participants were randomly rematched for ten rounds to play the game shown
in Table 3.
T3 (IEDS-IEDS): In IEDS-IEDS participants were ﬁrst matched in ﬁxed groups of four players to
play the 70% version of the guessing game during ﬁve rounds. In this game all group members have to
8See Nagel (1995), Stahl (1998) or Grosskopf and Nagel (2007,2009) among many others.
9For them the term dissimilar means that there is no re-labeling of actions which makes games monotonic transformations
of each other. This is true for all our games considered even for those that we call ‘strategically similar’. See also Rankin et al
(2000).
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H M L
H 10, 10 8, 12 16, 8
M 12, 8 10, 10 6, 6
L 8, 16 6, 6 10, 10
Table 1: 3x3 IEDS game
H M L
H 10, 10 8, 6 8, 8
M 6, 8 10, 10 6, 6
L 8, 8 6, 6 10, 10
Table 2: 3x3 pure Coordination game
simultaneously guess a number between 0 and 100. The participant closest to 70% of the average guess wins
ﬁve Euros and ties are resolved randomly. Afterwards they were randomly matched for ten rounds to play
the game shown in Table 1.
T4 (COR-COR): In COR-COR participants were ﬁrst matched in ﬁxed groups of four players to
play the 100% version of the guessing game during ﬁve rounds. In this game all group members have to
simultaneously guess a number between 0 and 100. The participant closest to the average guess wins ﬁve
Euros and ties are resolved randomly. Afterwards they were randomly matched for ten rounds to play the
game shown in Table 2.
T4* (COR-COR*): In COR-COR* participants ﬁrst played the 100% version of the guessing game
during ﬁve rounds. Afterwards they were randomly matched for ten rounds to play the game shown in Table
3.
T5 (IEDS-COR): In IEDS-COR participants ﬁrst played the 70% version of the guessing game during
ﬁve rounds. Afterwards they were randomly matched for ten rounds to play the game shown in Table 2.
T5* (IEDS-COR*): In IEDS-COR participants ﬁrst played the 70% version of the guessing game
during ﬁve rounds. Afterwards they were randomly matched for ten rounds to play the game shown in
Table 5.
T6 (COR-IEDS): In COR-IEDS participants ﬁrst played the 100% version of the guessing game during
ﬁve rounds. Afterwards they were randomly matched for ten rounds to play the game shown in Table 1.
Written instructions were distributed at the beginning of each phase. In treatments T3-T6 participants
knew at the start of phase 1 that there would be a second phase in the experiment but did not know what
it would look like.10 Matching groups were of size 8 in all treatments. Participants were informed that
they were matched with the same group of participants in the ﬁrst phase and that they would be randomly
10Sample Instructions for treatment IEDS-IEDS can be found in the Appendix.
H M L
H 10, 10 8, 5 6, 3
M 5, 8 12, 12 5, 3
L 3, 6 3, 5 15, 15
Table 3: 3x3 Coordination game with tradeoﬀ between risk dominance and eﬃciency
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rematched in each period in the second phase. Moreover, in T3-T6 participants were told in the instructions
for phase 2, that ‘they will likely be paired up with participants who they have not played with in phase 1’.
Actions H,M,L were labeled ‘High’, ‘Medium’ and ‘Low’ in the experimental instructions and were labeled
as shown in Tables 1 and 2 on the decision screens during the experiment. This labeling was chosen in order
to enable participants to draw a connection between the action sets in the two games, either because of
“naive extrapolation” or in order to use behavior in the ﬁrst game as a Coordination device.
At the end of each round of the guessing game participants were informed about the diﬀerent guesses
made in their group and whether they had won or not. At the end of each round of the 3x3 game participants
were told their action choice and that of their match as well as their payoﬀ.
In addition to a show up fee of 2 Euros, overall earnings were the sum of earnings from all rounds.
Earnings from the ﬁrst phase were directly given in Euros. Earnings from the second phase were given in
ECU (experimental currency unit) and converted into Euros according to the exchange rate 1Euro=20ECU.
The experiment lasted between 35 (T1, T2 and T2*) to 60 minutes (T3-T6) and participants earned on
average 12,60 Euros with a minimum of 6,40 Euros and a maximum of 34,20 Euros.
3 Hypotheses
The most basic hypothesis we wish to test is Hypothesis 0 which claims that there is no extrapolation
between games. This hypothesis amounts to saying that there should be no treatment diﬀerences in how the
3x3 game is played between IEDS, IEDS-IEDS and COR-IEDS, no diﬀerences between COR, COR-COR
and IEDS-COR and no diﬀerences between COR*, COR-COR* and IEDS-COR*.
Hypothesis 0 There is no extrapolation between games. In particular, subjects’ behaviour in the 3x3 game
is not diﬀerent across treatments IEDS, IEDS-IEDS and COR-IEDS, nor across COR, COR-COR
and IEDS-COR, nor across COR*, COR-COR*, IEDS-COR*.
Next we wish to test whether experienced subjects “learn faster” in the second game.
Hypothesis 1 Extrapolation always “improves” convergence to equilibrium. In particular convergence in
the 3x3 game is faster in both IEDS-IEDS and COR-IEDS compared to IEDS, faster in both COR-COR
and IEDS-COR compared to COR and faster in COR-COR* and IEDS-COR* compared to COR*.
If we failed to reject Hypothesis 1, this would provide support for the conjecture that subjects learn
about the population they are playing against. As an extreme case consider a fully rational decision maker
who understands and distinguishes both games perfectly but who is unsure about the distribution of types in
the population. If this were the case the decision maker could use the ﬁrst game to reduce her uncertainty
about the composition of the population (e.g. in terms of rationality of other players). If we can reject
Hypothesis 1, then we can reject the idea that extrapolation is limited to learning about the population
alone.
The following hypotheses 2a and 2b capture the idea that there is structural learning. If this is the
case extrapolation will only improve convergence to equilibrium if the ﬁrst game (from which participants
extrapolate) is strategically similar to the second game.
Hypothesis 2a Extrapolation ”improves” play if a strategically similar game has been played before.
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Hypothesis 2b Extrapolation ”hurts” play if a strategically diﬀerent game has been played before.
Taken together, hypotheses 2a and 2b imply the following ranking: IEDS-IEDS ≥ IEDS ≥ COR-IEDS,
where “≥” here means faster convergence to equilibrium, COR-COR ≥ COR ≥ IEDS-COR and COR-
COR* ≥ COR* ≥ IEDS-COR*. If we fail to reject Hypotheses 2a and 2b, this would be consistent with
the conjecture that some structural learning occurs. If in addition IEDS ≥ COR-IEDS and COR(*) ≥
IEDS-COR(*), then we could conclude that structural learning matters at least as much as learning about
the population in our context.
Our last hypothesis conjectures that extrapolation may be more eﬀective in games which can be solved
through deliberative reasoning (in particular games solvable through IEDS) as opposed to games which have
to be solved through intuition. The conjecture is that since in the ﬁrst class of games there is a unique way
of solving the game, extrapolation may be more eﬀective in such games.
Hypothesis 3 Extrapolation is more eﬀective if games can be solved by deliberative reasoning (as opposed
to games which have to be solved intuitively).
4 Results
4.1 Behavior in the Guessing Games
Let us start by describing behavior in the guessing games. The following two graphs illustrate the distribution
of guesses in the 70%-version and the 100%-version of the game. While in the 70%-version guesses are
decreasing over time, there is no such time trend in the Keynes game (100% -version), where most guesses
are concentrated around 40-50. Variance remains higher in the 100% version. Clearly the two games are
played diﬀerently. In the 70%-version subjects’ behavior seems to converge over time towards the unique
Nash equilibrium where everyone guesses 0. In the Keynes guessing game the focal Nash equilibrium seems
to be to bid 50, which is the amount where most initial guesses are concentrated. In fact in the Keynes
version 65% of guesses are in the interval [40,60] already in Period 1 and the modal guess is 50. In the
standard version the modal guess is 10. By Period 5 only one guess is higher than 30 and 85% of guesses
are below 12.
A simple panel data OLS regression indicates that while there is a strong and signiﬁcant time trend in
the IEDS version of the guessing game there is only a much weaker and marginally signiﬁcant time trend
in the Coordination version of the guessing game. The regression table can be found in the Appendix. The
following table illustrates the average guess in period 5 (i.e. the last round of the guessing game) in the
diﬀerent treatments.
IEDS-IEDS IEDS-COR IEDS-COR* COR-COR COR-IEDS COR-COR*
average guess period 5 9.41 8.91 8.87 36.83 43.25 44.29
(Standard Deviation) (6.39) (7.02) (8.06) (13.92) (10.05) (10.85)
Table 4: Average Guess in last period of Guessing Game.
As expected average guesses in the 70 percent (IEDS)-version of the game are much lower than average
guesses in the 100% (COR)-version of the game and those diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant. (Mann-
Whitney, p < 0.0001). Also, as expected, there are no treatment diﬀerences between IEDS-IEDS, IEDS-COR
and IEDS-COR* or between COR-COR, COR-IEDS or COR-COR*.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Guesses ’IEDS guessing game’ (70%-version).
Figure 2: Distribution of Guesses ’Keynes guessing game’ (100%-version).
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4.2 Extrapolation in Games solvable through IEDS
Now we are ready to look at extrapolation. Let us start with the games which are solvable through de-
liberative reasoning, i.e. the games solvable through IEDS. The unique Nash equilibrium in the 3x3 game
represented in Table 1 is (M,M). Table 5 illustrates the distribution of choices in the 3x3 IEDS game. There
seem to be somewhat more M− choices in IEDS-IEDS compared to the other treatments and somewhat
less H− choices. On average, though, there is not much diﬀerence.
H M L
IEDS 0.29 0.70 0.01
IEDS-IEDS 0.21 0.75 0.04
COR-IEDS 0.24 0.70 0.06
Table 5: Average share of H/M/L choices in the 3x3 IEDS game.
To see treatment diﬀerences we have to look at the distribution of choices over time. Figure 3 illustrates
the share of M-choices (i.e. Nash choices) over time in the three treatments.
Figure 3: Share of M Choices over time in the 3x3 IEDS game. The dotted line displays treatment IEDS,
the dots are IEDS-IEDS and the line without dots represents COR-IEDS.
The ﬁrst thing to notice is that while participants seem to learn the Nash equilibrium in treatments
IEDS and IEDS-IEDS, there is no convergence in treatment COR-IEDS. Also learning seems to be better
in IEDS-IEDS compared to IEDS (especially faster as the Figure and the regression below illustrate) but
it is substantially worse in COR-IEDS. Playing a game largely based on intuition seems to hurt eﬀective
learning in games based on reasoning. Table 6 shows that, indeed, there is very little learning in treatment
COR-IEDS compared to other treatments. One possible explanation is that there is structural learning.
Participants seem to be able to learn about the structural properties of the guessing games and then try
to apply this knowledge afterwards, leading to better convergence in IEDS-IEDS and worse convergence in
COR-IEDS. Playing a coordination game where intuition (or some ‘gut-feeling’) is needed to reach a Nash
equilibrium, seems to bring participants into the wrong ‘mode’ of play when afterwards playing a game
which is solvable through IEDS. In support of this explanation, Kuo et al. (2009) ﬁnd evidence that two
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diﬀerent parts of the brain may be used to play these diﬀerent classes of games.
Learning
IEDS 0.50
IEDS-IEDS 0.55
COR-IEDS 0.12
Table 6: Percentage of M choices. Diﬀerence between period 10(15) and period 1(6).
We also ran panel data logit regressions to explain the share of M choices in the IEDS game through the
time period, treatment dummies as well as interaction terms. The period variable counts from 6, ...15 and
time period in IEDS is normalised to this count. The baseline is treatment IEDS. The results are presented
in Table 7.
M− Choices in IEDS Game (1) (2)
constant −0.6506∗∗ −0.3768
(0.1226) (0.4207)
period 0.3608∗∗∗ 0.3389∗∗∗
(0.0682) (0.0632)
IEDS-IEDS −4.3673∗∗∗ −4.9408∗∗∗
(1.1366) (1.1033)
COR-IEDS 0.8455
(0.8986)
periodX(IEDS-IEDS) 0.3924∗∗∗ 0.3942∗∗∗
(0.1247) (0.1222)
periodX(COR-IEDS) −0.2423∗∗∗ −0.1817∗∗∗
(0.0905) (0.0633)
ρ 0.4918 0.4917
Table 7: Panel Data Logit Regression ∗∗∗1%,∗∗5%,∗10%. ((Pr > X 2) < 0.0001)
The results from the regression conﬁrm our intuitions derived from the Figure. The positive coeﬃcient on
period indicates that over time people learn to play the equilibrium. There are signiﬁcantly less M− choices
in IEDS-IEDS than in IEDS initially. The positive coeﬃcient on periodX(IEDS-IEDS) shows that there is
faster learning, though, in IEDS-IEDS compared to IEDS, implying that starting in period 10 approximately
(i.e. the 5th period of the 3x3 IEDS game) there are more M− choices in IEDS-IEDS compared to IEDS.11
The coeﬃcient on COR-IEDS is not signiﬁcant, i.e. initially there are not signiﬁcantly more M− choices
in COR-IEDS compared to IEDS. On the other hand the negative coeﬃcient on periodX(COR-IEDS)
shows that convergence to equilibrium is much worse in COR-IEDS compared to IEDS, and hence also in
IEDS-IEDS. We also ran the same regression but including a square term period2 as well as interaction
terms period2X(IEDS-IEDS) and period2X(COR-IEDS) and found that we can jointly omit them from the
regression (Pr > X 2 = 0.1548).
11Note that since the graph depicts the predictions for the quadratic rather than linear regression the intersection of the two
curves there is already around Period 8.
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The evidence rejects Hypothesis 0 that there is no extrapolation across games. Play in all three treat-
ments is pairwise signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
It also seems that playing a strategically similar game before, as it is the case in IEDS-IEDS helps
convergence to equilibrium. There is a both a higher share of M− choices in the last period in IEDS-IEDS
compared to IEDS and COR-IEDS and learning is faster in IEDS-IEDS compared to the other treatments.
Playing a strategically diﬀerent game hurts. Learning is much worse in COR-IEDS compared to the other
treatments. Hence we can reject Hypothesis 1. Learning (and extrapolation) is not limited to learning about
the population. On the other hand the ranking of our treatments seems to suggest that there is structural
learning. Participants are able to learn the structural properties of a game and extrapolate such knowledge
when playing other games subsequently.
We ask next if we can detect any evidence of ‘naive extrapolation’, possibly in the ﬁrst rounds of play for
the 3x3 IEDS game. Given that in the 70%-version of the guessing game subjects’ behaviour converges to low
guesses, if naive extrapolation is taking place, we would expect a relatively higher share of L choices in IEDS-
IEDS than in IEDS. Similarly, given that in the 100%-version of the guessing game subjects coordinated on
medium guesses, we would expect a relatively higher share of M choices in COR-IEDS compared to IEDS.
Table 8 shows the percentages of M and L choices in the ﬁrst period of the 3x3 game.
L in period 1 (6) M in period 1 (6)
IEDS 0 0.46
IEDS-IEDS 0.08 0.41
COR-IEDS 0.08 0.54
Table 8: Naive Extrapolation - M and L choices in the ﬁrst period of the 3x3 IEDS game.
This table suggests that there is only a weak eﬀect of naive extrapolation in the IEDS game. We do
observe more L choices in IEDS-IEDS than in IEDS and more M choices in COR-IEDS than in IEDS.
However, a Mann-Whitney test shows that the distribution of choices in the ﬁrst round does not diﬀer
pairwise between any two treatments (p > 0.1529). Moreover the distribution of M choices between IEDS
and COR-IEDS does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.2160). We do however ﬁnd signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the distribution of L choices between IEDS and IEDS-IEDS if we focus on the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds
of play (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.0269). Overall the eﬀect of naive extrapolation seems rather weak. The
predominant eﬀect of extrapolation aﬀecting play in the 3x3 game seems to be a consequence of structural
learning.
4.3 Extrapolation in Coordination Games
Let us now see whether and how extrapolation aﬀects the coordination games, i.e. games which are not
solvable through deliberative reasoning alone but which require subjects to use some intuition on what the
others will play in order to reach an equilibrium. Table 9 shows the percentage of H/M/L choices across all
periods.
Quite amazingly in COR participants coordinate immediately on the equilibrium (H,H). In both COR-
COR and IEDS-COR coordination is worse with a signiﬁcant share of participants choosing L. Interestingly
in COR-COR where participants play the coordination version of the guessing game before many more
participants choose the risk dominated action M. This is a strong indicator that some participants may try
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H M L H M L
COR 0.98 0.01 0.00 COR* 0.16 0.02 0.81
COR-COR 0.52 0.27 0.20 COR-COR* 0.19 0.10 0.71
IEDS-COR 0.78 0.01 0.19 IEDS-COR* 0.16 0.03 0.80
Table 9: Overall share of H/M/L choices in the Coordination games
to use the coordination version of the guessing game (where coordination occurred on Medium guesses) as
a coordination device in the following game.
In the coordination game with pareto ranked equilibria we observe a qualitatively similar pattern. Now
participants try to coordinate on the eﬃcient equilibrium (L,L). Again, though, in COR-COR* there are
more M-choices than in any of the other treatments suggesting that participants try indeed to use the modal
behavior in the guessing game as a Coordination device. We will come back to this later in this section.
Figure 4: Rate of Succesful Coordination over time in the 3x3 Coordination Game. The dotted line shows
treatment COR. The dots indicate Coordination in COR-COR. The line without dots represents treatment
IEDS-COR.
Figure 4 shows the percentage of succesful Coordination (on any of the Nash equilibria) over time. In
COR there is almost perfect coordination on (H,H) from the beginning. In COR-COR initially coordination
is worst, but then there is a steep learning curve with more than 90% of succesful coordination eventually.
In IEDS-COR there is more coordination initially than in COR-COR, although less than in COR, and there
is almost no learning. Hence, as in the case of the IEDS games playing a strategically diﬀerent game seems
to distort learning signiﬁcantly.
Figure 5 shows the analogous graph for the Coordination game with pareto ranked equilibria. Learning
is much better in COR-COR* compared to COR* or IEDS-COR*. Hence again playing a strategically
similar game before seems to improve convergence in the 3x3 game providing additional evidence for the
importance of structural learning.
Again we ran panel data logit regressions to explain the rate of succesful coordination in the coordination
game through the time period, treatment dummies, square as well as interaction terms. Table 10 shows the
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Figure 5: Rate of Succesful Coordination over time in the 3x3 Coordination Game given by . The dotted line
shows treatment COR*. The dots indicate Coordination in COR-COR*. The line without dots represents
treatment IEDS-COR*.
results of this regression. The baseline treatment is COR or COR* respectively.
The regression table 10 shows the results. Unlike in the case of IEDS games, this time we cannot omit
the period2 terms entirely from the regression (
(
Pr > X 2) < 0.0001), but we can omit the interaction terms
periodXperiodX(COR-COR) and periodXperiodX(IEDS-COR) (
(
Pr > X 2) = 0.4021).
Again Hypothesis 0 has to be rejected, since behavior in all three treatments signiﬁcantly diﬀers. Hy-
potheses 1 is also clearly rejected, as it is not true that any type of previous experience aids equilibrium play
and coordination and in particular playing a strategically diﬀerent game as in IEDS-COR or IEDS-COR*
does not help (and in IEDS-COR even hurts) convergence to equilibrium compared to the control treatment.
On the other hand in COR-COR* convergence is much better compared to COR*. Hence we can again
reject Hypothesis 1. Learning and hence extrapolation is not limited to learning about the population also
for the Coordination games.
Again there is strong evidence for structural learning. Convergence to equilibrium is much better in
COR-COR* compared to both COR* and IEDS-COR* and much better in COR-COR compared to IEDS-
COR. However the rate of succesful coordination overall is still higher in COR compared to COR-COR and
initially coordination is much worse also in COR-COR* compared to COR*. The reason is that now in the
Coordination games there is a strong eﬀect of what we have termed “naive extrapolation” before. We are
a bit reluctant to call this type of extrapolation naive in the context of coordination games, since it may
make sense to try and use the modal choice in the ﬁrst game as a Coordination device for the second game.
Table 11 shows the percentage of M and L choices in the ﬁrst period of the 3x3 coordination game.
Indeed participants seem to use the outcome of the guessing game as a coordination device for the
coordination game in treatment COR-COR. There are more M choices in the ﬁrst period of the game in
COR-COR compared to COR (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.0430). This is inspite of the fact that action M is risk
dominated. Also in COR-COR* there are more M-choices initially compared to COR* (Mann-Whitney,
p = 0.0046). There are also more L choices in IEDS-COR compared to COR (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.0387)
and in IEDS-COR* compared to COR* (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.0478).
14
Succesful Coordination (COR-1) (COR-2) (COR*)
const 3.8889∗∗ 2.3902∗∗ 2.1827∗∗∗
(1.8058) (1.0487) (0.7555)
period 0.4339 1.5065∗∗∗ −0.2193
(0.9876) (0.2574) (0.2976)
periodXperiod −0.0040 −0.1154∗∗∗ 0.0261
(0.1081) (0.0143) (0.0269)
COR-COR(COR*) −16.4971∗∗∗ −14.4743∗∗∗ −13.9374∗∗∗
(2.6468) (1.6394) (2.0566)
IEDS-COR(COR*) −17.1326∗∗∗ −15.8419∗∗∗ −4.1908
(2.6252) (1.7421) (1.8360)
periodX(COR-COR(COR*)) 2.5340∗∗ 1.1813∗∗∗ 2.5483∗∗∗
(1.0694) (0.2552) (0.5172)
periodX(IEDS-COR(COR*)) 1.1562∗∗ 0.2795∗∗∗ 2.8992
(0.6656) (0.0611) (0.7799)
periodXperiodX(COR-COR(COR*)) −0.1258 −0.1141∗∗∗
(0.1100) (0.0346)
periodXperiodX(IEDS-COR(COR*)) −0.1015 −0.1433∗
(0.1099) (0.0329)
ρ 0.4450 0.4432 0.3065
Table 10: Panel Data Logit Regression ∗∗∗ 1%,∗∗ 5%,∗ 10%
L in period 1 (6) M in period 1 (6) L in period 1 (6) M in period 1 (6)
COR 0 0.04 COR* 0.62 0.08
COR-COR 0.16 0.25 COR-COR* 0.55 0.29
IEDS-COR 0.13 0.08 IEDS-COR* 0.88 0.00
Table 11: M and L choices in the ﬁrst period of the 3x3 Coordination games.
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The fact that there are also more L-choices in COR-COR compared to COR is only weakly signiﬁcant
(Mann-Whitney, p = 0.0767) and could be due to the fact that one of the groups in COR-COR did coordinate
on low guesses of around 10 in the guessing game. If we correlate a binary variable indicating whether
participants chose M in the ﬁrst period of the 3x3 game (in treatment COR-COR) with the last guess
participants make in the guessing game, we ﬁnd some support for the conjecture that some participants
may try to use the guessing game as a Coordination device. (Spearman, ρ = 0.3234∗∗).
5 Discussion and Conclusions
We conduct an experiment to study whether and how people extrapolate between very diﬀerent, but strate-
gically similar games. We found clear evidence that extrapolation does occur between games. Playing a
strategically diﬀerent game hurts convergence to Nash equilibrium, while playing a strategically similar
game before leads to better (faster) convergence in the second game.
Our analysis allows us to conclude that (apart from learning about the population and about succesful
actions) participants are also able to learn about the structural properties of the underlying game. This
structural learning is particularly relevant for extrapolation and seems to be the main type of knowledge
people transfer to other games. This eﬀect seems robust and is true for both IEDS-games as well as for
Coordination games.
There is one fundamental diﬀerence, though, in the impact of extrapolation on equilibrium play for
games which can be solved through deliberative reasoning, such as dominance solvable games, and games
for which some intuition is also needed in order to converge to a Nash equilibrium, such as coordination
games.
While structural learning is important for both, there is an additional strong eﬀect of “naive extrapola-
tion” of action labels in Coordination games. In these games players try to use the modal behavior in the
ﬁrst game as a Coordination device for the second game. (Of course this is only possible if action labels
are the same or similar). Hence any previous experience acquired by the experimental subjects through
the guessing game increases strategic uncertainty for the players by introducing competing focal points.
This occurs irrespectively of whether the experience that subjects have acquired is in a (potentially useful)
strategically similar game, or a dissimilar one.
Such consideration leads us to a more general discussion on what could ideally be learned and extrapo-
lated in games. Within the class of dominance solvable game it is clear that the skill that subjects should
ideally take from one game to the next is the ability to identify the (unique) equilibrium through the pro-
cess of iterated deletion of dominated strategies. In the coordination games what seems more diﬃcult is to
successfully coordinate on one of the equilibria. Here any shared (or individual) experience can be used as a
focal point. We conjecture that in larger games than those studied here extrapolation of action labels may
be crucial to achieve succesful coordination.
These results can be very helpful to make predictions about outcomes or design mechanisms in applica-
tions. Some examples are organization design or the introduction of new laws and regulations in generally.
Understanding how knowledge is transfered between games and how this depends on the type of strategic
situation faced can also inform theoretical models of learning across games and categorization. Most of the
current literature on categorization or learning across games focuses on what we have called ‘naive extrap-
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olation’.12 Understanding structural learning and improved learning via extrapolation of strategic context
seems harder to model and to understand. There is large scope for future research to understand these
eﬀects.
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A Additional Regression Tables
guess 70% version 100% versiom
constant 48.283∗∗∗ 51.066∗∗∗
(2.95) (2.73)
period −9.910∗∗∗ −3.820∗
(2.11) (1.88)
period*period 0.4176 0.3799
(0.3465) (0.3055)
ρ 0.3673 0.5280
Table 12: Panel data OLS regression of Guesses.
B Sample Instructions T3
Welcome and thank you for participating to this experiment.
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. The instructions are simple. If you follow
them closely and make appropriate decisions, you may make an appreciable amount of money that will be
paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment. For your participation you will receive 2 Euros. Further
winnings in the experiment depend on your decisions and that of others as well as random events.
There are two phases to this experiment. Detailed instructions for the second phase will be distributed
to you after the ﬁrst phase has been completed.
Instructions for the ﬁrst phase
• In this ﬁrst phase you will play a simple guessing game together with 3 other participants in the
experiment.
• All participants simultaneously guess a number between 0 and 100 (inclusive).
• In order to win, try to guess the number closest to 70 percent of the average of all numbers guessed by
the participants in your group (including yourself). The guess closest to this number, i.e. the guess
closest to
0.7× the summation of all guesses
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wins. If people tie for the closest guess, the winner will be selected randomly from amongst those
people.
• The winner receives 5 euros.
• You will play this guessing game 5 times, always with the same participants.
• After each period we will inform you about the diﬀerent guesses made and whether you won or not.
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• The winnings for the ﬁrst phase of this experiment are equal to the sum of the winnings you may have
made in the 5 rounds of the guessing game.
If you have any questions about these instructions or the experiment, then please raise your hand.
Enjoy!
Instructions for the second phase
• In this second phase you will likely be paired up with participants who you have not played with in
phase 1. There are ten rounds in this second phase and in each round you will be randomly rematched
with a new participant.
• In this phase you have to make one out of three possible bids, labeled High, Medium and Low.
• Your winnings in each round depend both on your bid and on your partner’s bid.
• The choices that both you and your partner make are blind: you will have to choose your bid without
knowing what your partner is choosing; similarly, your partner will choose his bid without knowing
what you are choosing.
• However both you and your partner are fully aware of the consequences in terms of winnings for both
of each combination of bids. The winnings from each combination of bids by yourself and your partner
are summarised in the table below. Winnings are stated in ECU (Experimental Currency Units).
your partner bids
High
your partner bids
Medium
your partner bids
Low
you bid
High
you win 10
your partner wins 10
you win 8
your partner wins 12
you win 16
your partner wins 8
you bid
Medium
you win 12
your partner wins 8
you win 10
your partner wins 10
you win 6
your partner wins 6
you bid
Low
you win 8
your partner wins 16
you win 6
your partner wins 6
you win 10
your partner wins 10
• After each period we will let you know which action your interaction partner in that period has chosen
and how much money you earned.
• Your winnings are equal to the sum of your winnings and converted into Euros according to the
exchange rate 1 Euro=20ECU.
If you have any questions about these instructions or the experiment, then please raise your hand.
Enjoy!
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